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This Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is submitted by Applicant/Respondent, Gary E. 
Crosland, who urges this Court not to accept Certiorari in this 
case. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Respondent does not dispute that this Court has 
jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution; 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3) and (5) (1989); and Rule 
45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The fact that this 
Court has jurisdiction to entertain this Writ does not, however, 
mean that it should or must. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure makes clear that "Review by a writ of 
certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion...." 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1988) is the 
controlling statute. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure is the controlling Rule containing the considerations 
governing review by Writ of Certiorari. There was no 
controlling definition of the phrase "prior impairment" at the 
time governed by the facts of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent does not dispute the Statement of the Case 
contained in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not dispute the Statement of Facts 
contained in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the 
exception that it must be underscored that the industrial injury 
which Mr. Crosland suffered on February 9, 1989, aggravated and 
made symptomatic a previously non-ratable, asymptomatic medical 
condition. 
Dr. Robert H. Home, Mr. Crosland7s treating physician, in 
a report dated September 28, 1989, stated that although Mr. 
Crosland had a pre-existing spondylolisthesis, the industrial 
injury caused the pre-existing spondylotytic defect to become 
acute and symptomatic. (R. at 59). 
On September 19, 1989, Dr. John F. Lilly, a physician for 
the carrier, examined Mr. Crosland and indicated that in his 
opinion Mr. Crosland had asymptomatic spondylolysis and 
spondylolisthesis prior to the industrial injury; and, 
significantly, that all of the symptoms suffered by Mr. Crosland 
were occasioned by the occurrence of the industrial injury. (R. 
at 59). 
Following the hearing, this matter was referred to a 
Medical Panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge which 
reported its conclusions on May 8, 1990, including the finding 
that Mr. Crosland had a 20% permanent, partial impairment of the 
whole body, attributing 10% to the industrial accident and 10% 
to "pre-existing conditions." (R. Vol. II at 194). It also 
concluded that the industrial accident aggravated Mr. Crosland's 
"pre-existing condition." (R. Vol. II at 184). Significantly, 
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it further commented as follows: 
a. It is the panel's position that the Applicant did 
probably have a developmental abnormality which had 
been asymptomatic up to the point of onset of symptoms 
from the twisting, lifting [industrial] injury. It is 
entirely possible he could have gone on for an 
indefinite period had it not been for the event 
described.... [Emphasis added] (R. Vol II at 182). 
b. The industrial injury did medically aggravate a 
pre-existing condition of the Applicant. Comment: As 
indicated previously, this was an asymptomatic 
condition, but an abnormal status was present to a 
sufficient degree to be contributory to his present 
impaired status. [Emphasis added] (R. Vol II at 184-
185) . 
The Order of the Administrative Law Judge of August 14, 
1990 adopted the Medical Panel Report and awarded compensation 
benefits to Mr. Crosland, but limited them to the 10% whole body 
permanent, partial impairment exclusively attributable to the 
industrial accident. She denied benefits for the additional 10% 
whole body permanent, partial impairment attributable to the 
asymptomatic, non-ratable condition which was aggravated and 
made symptomatic by the industrial accident (R. at 76-77). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court should not accept Certiorari in this 
case. The Utah Court of Appeals has been the Court of last 
resort in Workers Compensation matters for many years, and 
although review of a Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is 
available by way of Writ of Certiorari, such review should be 
strictly limited and only granted in the most important matters 
in order to maintain the integrity of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and promote judicial economy. 
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The decision below, from which review is sought is also a 
very narrow one spanning a period between 1988 and 1991. The 
Utah Court of Appeals recognized that in 1991, the Utah 
Legislature amended the Worker's Compensation Act to precisely 
define the term "impairment" by statute which was not the case 
when Mr. Crosland was injured. The decision below is strictly 
limited to those injuries occurring between 1988 and 1991 and in 
all likelihood constitutes law of the case only. 
And finally, the Decision below by the Utah Court of 
Appeals (which was unanimous) is a correct one. A cursory 
reading of it will confirm its reasonableness and logic. 
A R G U M E N T 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT EXERCISE ITS 
DISCRETION TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS MATTER. 
A. A PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOT RENDERED 
A DECISION IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF ANOTHER PANEL OF THE 
COURT ON THE SAME ISSUE OF LAW, AS SPECIFIED UNDER RULE 46(A) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Petitioners allege that the decisions of different panels 
of the Utah Court of Appeals in the cases of Crosland v. Board 
of Review, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (March 20, 1992) and Nvrehn v. 
Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) are in 
conflict and that such conflict warrants review by this Court 
pursuant to Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This alleged conflict arises, as Petitioners read Nvrehn to 
require apportionment of permanent, total disability 
compensation between asymptomatic, pre-existing conditions and 
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the industrial injury, while they allege that Crosland stands 
for the proposition that there is no apportionment. In so 
arguing, Petitioners misinterpret the true holdings in each of 
those cases. 
As Respondent argued before the Court of Appeals, the sole 
issue in Nyrehn was whether the claimant had suffered a 
compensable injury and could prove legal causation under the 
rule announced in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986). The issue of any apportionment of the claimants 
disability between pre-existing incapacity and the industrial 
injury was neither briefed nor argued by any of the parties in 
that case. 
The holding of Nyrehn is that "when an accident is the 
climax of repeated exertions, as in Nyrehn's case, work-related 
'exertion7, for purpose of proving legal causation, is the 
aggregate exertion of the repetitive exertions that establish 
the accident." Id. at 336. The Court's cursory statement that 
"...the case is remanded with instructions to grant Nyrehn 
benefits for total permanent disability as calculated by the 
Administrative Law Judge" [Id. at 337] did not judicially adopt 
an apportionment rule in workers compensation cases. 
While it is true that the Petitioner in Nyrehn also had an 
asymptomatic pre-existing condition of spondylolysis and that 
the Medical Panel apportioned 75% of her total permanent 
impairment to the industrial accident and 25% to a pre-existing 
incapacity, she was awarded permanent, total disability benefits 
without an offset for her pre-existing asymptomatic condition. 
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The apportionment specified in that case was for the 
purpose of allocating the liability for payments between the 
employer and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund (formerly the 
Second Injury Fund). Crosland, on the other hand, did not 
involve any issue as to apportionment with the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund. The "apportionment" issue discussed in those 
two cases was not on the "same issue of law" as that phrase is 
used in Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As 
the Utah Court of Appeals noted in Crosland: 
This reliance is misplaced because the Nyrehn case 
merely apportions between the employer and the fund 
under this section and does not address the issue of 
apportionment between the employer and the employee. 
Id. at 38, footnote 6. 
Nyrehn received the full value of her disability with no 
reduction for pre-existing injury. She, like Mr. Crosland, had 
an asymptomatic, pre-existing condition of spondylolysis. Her 
Medical Panel found that 75% of her permanent impairment was due 
to the industrial accident while 25% was due to pre-existing 
conditions. Nevertheless, she received 100% compensation, 
including the 25% prior asymptomatic condition which only became 
symptomatic by reason of the industrial injury. 
If Nyrehn stands for any relevant proposition in this case, 
it is that the worker is not penalized for the aggravation of an 
asymptomatic pre-existing injury which only becomes symptomatic 
by reason of an industrial accident. Nyrehn is not an authority 
by which a claimant's award can be reduced by the degree of 
disability which can be apportioned to an asymptomatic pre-
existing injury. 
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Not only is there no conflict between Crosland and Nyrehn, 
but, in fact, as Respondent successfully argued to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Nyrehn is actually persuasive authority for 
the proposition that in workers compensation matters one does 
not apportion between the employer and the employee, but only in 
appropriate cases between the employer and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-69 (1988). McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
There is no conflict in the decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals dealing with "apportionment." Petitioners only seek to 
create one by confusing the concepts of "apportionment" between 
the employer and the employee and the statutory "apportionment" 
between the employer and the Employers7 Reinsurance Fund that 
arises pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 (1988). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently examined the 
interpretation that is to be given that statute. In Virgin v. 
Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the Court 
noted: 
In 1988, Section 35-1-69 was repealed and a new 
Section 35-1-69 was reenacted. Under the current 
version, the test for apportioning liability for 
compensation requires at least a ten percent pre-
existing whole person permanent impairment with 
additional impairment caused by accident from 
employment resulting in permanent total disability 
before liability for compensation is apportioned. Id. 
footnote 5 at 1288. 
There is no reasonable basis for asserting that there is 
presently any confusion as to when and under what circumstances 
"apportionment" applies in Utah workers compensation matters. 
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If there were, the Virgin case answers it. 
B. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOT DECIDED A QUESTION OF 
STATE LAW IN A WAY THAT CONFLICTS WITH A DECISION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT, AS SPECIFIED UNDER RULE 46(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Petitioners allege that the Utah Court of Appeals decision 
in Crosland is in conflict with this Courts rulings in Morton 
Int'l., Inc. v. Auditing Division. 814 P. 2d 581 (Utah 1991) and 
Holloway v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986). 
Once again, Petitioners are guilty of misreading case law since 
no conflict in fact exists. Since Morton and Holloway deal with 
different issues of law they will be discussed separately. 
1. THE HOLDING IN CROSLAND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH 
MORTON, 
In Morton this Court stated as follows: 
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory 
construction, the Utah Administrative Procedure Act 
does not change the standard of review when the Court 
is in as good a position as the agency to determine 
the issue or when the agency has been granted 
discretion in interpreting the statute. However, 
nothing in the language of Section 63-46b-16 or its 
legislative history suggests that an agency/s decision 
is entitled to deference solely on the basis of agency 
expertise or experience. Indeed, there is no 
reference to agency expertise or experience in the 
statute or the statute's legislative history. Rather, 
in granting judicial relief when an 'agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law,' the 
language of Section 63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates 
that absent a grant of discretion, a correction of 
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory term. 
Id. at 588. 
The Court of Appeals in Crosland recognized this Court's 
ruling in Morton by stating as follows: 
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This proceeding is governed ^* ""he Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) , Utah -/ode Ann,. 
Section 63-46b~l to-22 (1989 & Supp. 1991) Section 
63-46b-16(4) (d) governs the scope of our review of the 
Industrial Commission's Order, allowing relief if 
Crosland has been 'substantially prejudiced' because 
'the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law.' In Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the 
Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 
1991), the Supreme Court held that under this section 
we may review for1 correctness and need not defer to 
tin! agency's interpretation unless there is "a grant 
of discretion to the agency concerning the language in 
question, either expressly made in the statute or 
implied from the statutory language. Id. at 589. 
When legislative intent can be discerned, howevex we 
give the agency's interpretation, no deference. Id.; 
accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of Review, 166 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 1991). This case requires an 
interpretation of the 1988 amendment to the Workers' 
Compensation Act and thus presents a question of 
statutory construction and legislative intent which we 
may review for correctness. Under this higher 
;• standard, to afford relief we must find that the 
Commission erroneously interpreted the law to 
Crosland's substantial prejudice, (Footnotes omi"-f.e ;: I 
Id. at 36. 
'i 11< 'ii i t 11 A, 11 ip,i i s Uiu& propei I y c 11ed and foil owod the 
standard ot review announced !•, H UP* igortq»" 
The most glaring defect in Petitioner's argument i,«» \ li.it 
even i • ••" • - otje.dk- w<n required • • defer l Min 
agency': interpretation •. : !. • .ii -,i .»;
 r * ,. i •, ' * ircaner*" 
riifM i f iiN«i'» "  |i fart which Respondent disputes), it i"... L. K.MI lit.","" 
1
 lie Industrial • "mum,,, I Qllos.I.a|}d never attempted, , • " » i 
f i rst i nstance , L I I nterpret t hat \ ei in. rl « i ndustr i a i 
"•tiv'i'p! • >, i <«i •" • order Denying Motion for Review is based entire* ly 
• I «i erroneous i
 M\ e» pi e.tai. i ut i . ne nolding in Hyiiehjn 
Nowherp in rlie1 "Order Denying Motion \<\r Re\iie^1 • iii,rM» ,n^ 
a t i % 'I.. (I. i i I'KH'f.iPt tii i phrase "prior impairment '*" In ( m i , 
the Order fails to even cite any :•(• rv the exception of 
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those governing appeals. 
2. THE HOLDING IN CROSLAND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH 
HOLLOWAY. 
The sole issue on appeal in Holloway was whether his injury 
was the result of an "accident" as that term is used in the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. This Court noted that the case was 
controlled by its prior decision in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986) and remanded to the 
Commission for reconsideration in light of Allen. 
Petitioners place great reliance on the concurring opinion 
of Justices Zimmermann and Howe: 
The sole question is whether the worker came to the 
workplace with a condition that increased his risk of 
injury. If he did and that condition contributed to 
the injury, then Allen's higher standard of legal 
causation comes into play to place that worker on the 
same footing as one who did not come to work with a 
preexisting condition. See Id. at 25-26. To rule 
otherwise would create the strong likelihood that a 
worker who has a pre-existing condition and whose 
virtually inevitable injury simply happens to occur at 
work will be able to foist the cost of that injury on 
his employer when the workplace had little to do with 
causing the injury. (Emphasis added) Id. at 32. 
Without addressing whether a concurring opinion states 
sufficient precedent to create a sufficient conflict to warrant 
review by Writ of Certiorari as required by Rule 46(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is clear that the 
conditions referred to in Holloway simply do not apply in 
Crosland. Even if the higher standard of legal causation set 
forth in Allen applies, Petitioners do not allege that Crosland 
would be unable to show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to the risk he already faced in everyday 
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I "I - bet • i ii s e •: > t hi'" condition. 
Tnt' record clear J v niiiii.'rifi11 r!Mt » Me MedicaJ Pane" 
Crosland found that the higher standai n FM-I neen nir i . 
It i^ Liu panel's position t.hat the Applicant 
(Crosland) did probably have a developmental 
abnormality which had been asymptomatic up to the 
point of onset of symptoms from the twisting, lifting 
[industrial] injury. It is entirely possible he could 
have gone on for an indefinite period had it not been 
for the event described, « . . [Emphasis added] , /T? Tr^1 
II at 182) . 
There Wed \ Kieni'i t>?fore the Industrie, ^mmissic*- ~~ 
the Utah Court of Appeals iVim;! i-et :i I, LUIK-
I In. ii" h"i ii ion tr.t this Court), i nat: Respondei r. - >i, , , 
IIMU .iif-in1."., i rii I"M\«VII -n w i i1 ' " i I'ln-f the "workplace h.*'. , * l 
do with causinq the injury" ns cautioned ^\ « r t n < V i i iimermann 
ai r |*j M • " • Hoi Iowa y deeisioi indeed ' ,M " m d i sputea 
evident T u« LIMI ne did suitei ..virtent" as that luiiii is 
used in Alien* 
Cs T H E UTAii CoURT ur APPEALS HAS NOT RENDERED A 
DECISION WHICH HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND 
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN 
EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVISION, 
AS SPECIFIED UNDER RULE 46(C) — ™ T™ "TAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Tti!"» essence of Petitioners' argument here is that tb<=> c •;. t 
of Appedls in, L'rubldiid . uuic u n w e d ,i "sweeping change* :he 
accepted and usual course of claims tiefore i \w < "ommi ssion H. 
/viii l e u : 1 ; „i i I i f (ft i h a t : : 
l"lhe final decision win have a significant impact on 
not only the amount of compensation injured employees 
may receive, but may also significantly affect the 
premiums employers will have to pay to provide workers 
compensation insurance coverage. The decision may 
also significant!\ impact ^he costs of providing 
compensation be.nef i t •- f * h,v^p employers which 
Ii 
qualify as self-insureds" (Brief of Amicus Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah at 9-10). 
Once again Petitioners, in an attempt to find an accepted 
basis for a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, have misstated the 
holding and implications of the Utah Court of Appeal's decision 
in Crosland. Crosland did not announce any "sweeping change" in 
the law concerning pre-existing injuries, but rather followed an 
existing body of law. 
Crosland only stands for the proposition that under 1988 -
1991 law, the aggravation of a pre-existing, asymptomatic 
condition is compensable since there is no apportionment of 
liability as between the employer and the employee* for symptoms 
resulting from the industrial accident. That holding is in 
conformance with a long line of prior decisions of this Court. 
See Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984), 
Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1982), 
reh'g granted, 660 P.2d 244 (Utah 1983), Nuzum v. Roosendahl 
Constr. & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977), and Tintic 
Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278 
(Utah 1922) . 
In addition, Professor Larson in his oft-cited treatise on 
Workmens Compensation speaks directly to this point when he 
states: 
Nothing is better established in compensation law than 
the rule that, when industrial injury precipitates 
disability from a latent prior condition,... the 
entire disability is compensable,... No attempt is 
made to weigh the relative contribution of the 
accident and the pre-existing condition to the final 
disability or death. Apportionment does not apply in 
such cases, nor in any case in which the prior 
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coniJit'ion was not u disability in the compensation 
sen* c J Larson, Workers Compensation Law, Section 
• . 59.? 7 i a) ('! 9 8 n) (Footnotes omitted.) 
Further evidence -n i> .. i, |.<i1 n > " of 
iiiipiM1 a>r i s i on in '-"! (is J and does tint rail tor an exercise of 
this Count's power ct L'I|JI'I " i e i nn > ^ i Is extremely limited value 
as precedent. Crosland was decided mi flu- basi u i 
ef f ec l i i I l ii i * i airoanl sti f f ered hi i s i ridusti: ia 1 
injury. v\*o Workers Comptaisal i n "ntali , in effect at that 
I i ITIP diil no* define the terra "prior impairment1 
Utah L.^'M i a I dt at e i inii Mil iimondments f • I'faii (."ode Annotated, 
Section il3"J"4') fi(J,,ll a! ! * . ! i'1 i in im" defined trie 
1 emia " impairment" and "disability • ilie Utah Court "t Appeals 
noted speci i icaiiy 111 11osland: 
Because these statutory definitions were nuL in ettect 
at the time of Crosland's injury, we need not decide 
their applicability to the wording of the 1988 
amendment. Instead we rely on the law as it existed 
at tho +"iTtie r»f the injury Id. at 38, footnote 5. 
The decision MI Crosland is thus strictly limiMiI i 
1991 Idu I I -In MI mil, I rannnt, npeu " hi '" i loodgates for an 
invidious torm of Industrial Coimiu. *:.-. i ' .1 iijiit iii1 * as A m a n s 
hysterically arquw All new claims tor compensation wi.i IM« 
governed \ <r • • « " i«w , « a" """> »» ( i anquaqe , 'The particuJar facts in 
Crosland. involving a pre-199 1 i h u m , mo m MI I a?'i~r ,ifi,iin and 
t i -] i nn , rather t han be J nu a ,l swee| -1 ng change in Ui. . «i w ' 
J S merely an awaiti < , l r • » i •• '" - 'linqLe claimant under old 
law. a 
1 3 
D. THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN 
CROSLAND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF 
STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED BY 
THIS COURT, AS SPECIFIED UNDER RULE 46(D) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
In their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioners 
argue: "... that the Crosland opinion is an issue of first 
impression to this Court and vitally affects all Utah employers 
and employees." (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, page 16.) 
This vague attempt to qualify under Rule 46(d) is not fully 
developed by either Petitioners or Amicus. No new arguments are 
advanced in order to establish a basis for review under this 
subsection; rather, Petitioner and Amicus merely rehash their 
prior arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has been historically the Court of 
last resort in Workers Compensation matters. This Court should 
not exercise its discretion to grant a Writ of Certiorari except 
in the most significant matters. Petitioners and Amicus have 
wholly failed to satisfy any of the bases provided in Rule 46 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, indicating the "character 
of reasons that will be considered" in a decision to accept 
review by way of a Writ of Certiorari. 
The decision in Crosland was a proper, logical and 
reasonable interpretation of the law as it existed at the time 
Mr. Crosland was injured. The 1991 definitions were not in 
effect at the time of Mr. Crosland's industrial injury, and the 
legislature did not make them retroactive and neither should 
this Court. 
14 
Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court 
enter an ondei uunyiM' i n * i'l.'i i i ' i i i IN if nf rertinrari and 
allow the decision ot the Utah Com I uf Appeais In SIHIII 
DAT Fl» this iilii day oi Ju.!" 1992.__ 
& VIRGINTqS DABNEY, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Applicant/Respondent 
l 
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